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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this thesis was to examine difficulties
associated with U.S. Marine Corps contracts awarded to
minority owned small businesses under the 8(a) program.
Specifically, causes of contract default and firm failure were
identified; indicators which illustrated difficulties leading
to default and firm failure were identified and steps which
could have alleviated these difficulties and thereby prevented
contract default or firm failure were recommended. A
historical and legislative background for the 8(a) program has
been developed. Six contract cases were examined in detail,
in conjunction with a mail survey of USMC contracting officers
and small business advocates, to determine the primary causes
of contract default and 8(a) firm failure and their
indicators. The thesis describes how observable indicators of
contract default and firm failure can be recognized and how
corrective action can be undertaken to significantly reduce
the incidence of default and firm failure when dealing with
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Section 8(a) of the Small Business Act authorizes the
Small Business Administration to enter into prime contracts
with Federal Government procurement agencies and issue
subcontracts for the performance of this work to small
businesses owned and managed by economically and socially
disadvantaged individuals. Due to their limited size, some
important contracts awarded by Marine Corps Logistics Base
(MCLB) Albany, GA qualify to be set aside for small
businesses, particularly disadvantaged businesses under the
8(a) program. Although relatively small with respect to
quantity and total price, the systems contracted for are
technologically complex enough to cause small companies to
assume a substantial amount of risk in contract performance.
As a result of this assumed risk, these companies face a
higher than average failure/default rate than larger
businesses
.
To ensure the success of Federal Government socio-economic
goals associated with contract set asides, steps must be
undertaken during the administration phase of contract
performance to minimize company failure and contract default.
This thesis will examine the difficulties associated with the
administration of contracts awarded to firms under the 8(a)
program. Furthermore, the research will propose the actions
the Government should employ to meet the goals the 8(a)
program seeks to attain.
B. OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH
The main objective of this thesis is to answer the primary
research question: What steps can the Government take when
dealing with 8(a) business concerns to prevent the firms from
failing or defaulting on contracts that have been awarded?
Secondarily, the thesis will answer the following subsidiary
questions
:
• What are the primary causes for failure or Termination
for Default by small business firms relative to
contracts awarded under the 8(a) program?
• What are the key indicators that an 8(a) firm is facing
difficulties that could lead to failure of the company
or a Termination for Default?
• What actions should the Government take to provide





This thesis will provide the historical and legislative
background for the Small Business Administration and the 8(a)
program. An overview of the 8(a) program is provided followed
by an examination of the program by the General Accounting
Office (GAO)
.
The thesis will then provide a comprehensive examination
of cases of 8(a) firm failure and Termination for Default.
These case analyses are factual representations of recent
contracts awarded under the 8(a) program by MCLB Albany, GA
and illustrate specific examples of failed companies.
An analysis of information provided in response to a mail
survey prepared for this thesis follows the case studies. The
responses contain information pertaining to the primary causes
of 8(a) firm failures and contract defaults. The responses
also provide key indicators of potential difficulties which
could lead to firm failure or Termination for Default. Steps
to alleviate these difficulties are also provided. This
information has been solicited from the contracting officers
and small business advocates at the ten U.S. Marine Corps
contracting offices and directorates.
D . METHODOLOGY
The background research material was collected from a
literatuic review utilizing the Defense Technical Information
Center, Defense Logistics Studies Information Exchange, the
Small Business Administration, the University of California,
Santa Cruz Library and the Dudley Knox Library at the Naval
Postgraduate School
.
The case summaries were derived from research performed at
MCLB Albany, GA where contract documents were reviewed and
interviews with cognizant contracting personnel were
conducted. Telephone interviews with appropriate Defense
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Contract Management Command ( DCMC ) representatives were also
conducted to more accurately represent the conditions and
circumstances surrounding each contract reviewed. Although
discussions with company representatives for all of the
contract cases was attempted, either no contact was possible
or no comments were provided by the company representatives.
The mail survey of the USMC contracting officers and the
small business advocates was developed to obtain a more broad
based and generic summary of difficulties associated with the
administration of contracts awarded under the 8(a) program.
The survey population consisted of the ten contracting
officers and ten small business advocates at the USMC
contracting offices and directorates. After the surveys were
completed the responses were collated and summarized in a
tabular format. This representation of the information
provides a sequential listing (in order from most common to
least common) of the causes and indicators of contract
default. Steps to alleviate these difficulties are also
provided in the same manner.
E. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS
The thesis is composed of five chapters. Chapter I is an
introduction to the thesis. Chapter II provides background,
an overview and a summary of problems with the 8(a) program as
a whole. Chapter III presents specific case summaries of
contracts which were terminated for default and illustrates
the causes of failure to perform; the indicators that
4
difficulties were being encountered and the steps which could
have led to successful contract actions. Chapter IV
summarizes and presents the information obtained from the mail
survey, and Chapter V provides conclusions and recommendations
based on all the information reviewed and analyzed during this
research effort.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE 8(A) PROGRAM
A. HISTORICAL AND LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND
In his book The Next American Frontier , Robert Reich
provides a fitting introduction to a study of a socio-economic
program. He writes:
The way people work together to produce goods and services
is intimately tied to the way they set and pursue public
goals. This link is perhaps stronger today than at any
time in America's past because we are moving into an era in
which economic progress depends to an unprecedented degree
upon collaboration in our work places and consensus in our
politics ... .Americans tend to divide the dimensions of our
national life into two broad realms. The first is the
realm of government and politics. The second is the realm
of business and economics. Issues of participation, equal
opportunity and civil rights ,... social security and
welf are . . . . are seen as aspects of government and politics.
Issues of productivity and economic growth, inflation and
unemployment, savings, investment, and trade are seen as
aspects of business and economics—the substance of our
business culture... In advanced industrial nations like the
United States, drawing such sharp distinctions between
government and market has long ceased to be useful.
Government creates the market by defining the terms and
boundaries for business activity, guided by public
perceptions of governmental responsibility for the overall
health of the economy. Business, meanwhile is taking on
tasks that once were the exclusive province of government,
involving responsibility for the work communities that are
coming to be many Americans ' most important social
environment. The interwoven organizations of government,
business, and labor together determine how America's
resources are allocated and employed. Public and private
spheres are becoming indistinguishable. [Ref. l:p. 3-5]
The interwoven nature of the current procurement policies
designed to implement socio-economic programs has been deeply
rooted in the history of the United States from its earliest
days. The Government of this country has been tasked with
significant responsibilities by the Founding Fathers through
the Constitution:
The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes,
Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide
for the common Defense and general Welfare of the United
States... To borrow Money... To regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the
Indian Tribes... To coin Money, regulate the value
thereof... To raise and support Armies... And To make all
Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into
Execution the foregoing Powers and all other Powers vested
by this Constitution in the Government of the United
States, or in any Department or Officer thereof. [Ref. 2]
With this broad authoritative guidance as a basis to support
the general welfare of the nation, our Government has
implemented numerous administrative and legislative actions
designed to advance the productivity of the economy and to
enhance the standard of living of the citizenry throughout our
history. In the early developing years, governmental
regulation was extremely limited. Many of the early settlers
came to America to avoid political and governmental oppression
and favored minimal interference from the Government . "Apart
from its role in developing early transportation systems,
government was not critical to the first stage of America's
economic evolution." [Ref. l:pg. 7] Competition was viewed as
the primary regulatory tool employed to insure that the
national economy would progress satisfactorily. [Ref. 3:pg.
26] America was primarily an agricultural nation not relying
heavily on industrial activity until about 1870. From 1860 to
1900 the value of this country's manufactured products surged
from $1.8 billion to $11 billion annually in constant dollars.
The annual increase in productivity over the same period
increased from .3% per year to over 1.8% per year--a sixfold
increase. As businesses grew, more and more capital flowed
into them. Unregulated and freewheeling, the growing
businesses' productive capacity over ran the nation's ability
to consume at a level high enough to support the fixed
production costs generated by all the now large companies.
[Ref. l:pp. 23-32] Price competition ensued which forced
many companies into bankruptcy. As these events occurred,
monopolies developed which imposed severe burdens on consumers
for required services and products. As a result, an era of
governmental regulation began. [Ref. 4:pp. 55-57]
The evolving American economy required systems of
organization that could give it stability and legitimacy.
Large, newly consolidated enterprises needed an
institutional structure that could confirm their new role
and help shield them against the ravages of the business
cycle. . . .And within society at large, popular acceptance of
industrialization depended on a system of public
administration to soften its social impact. [Ref. l:p. 43)
The Interstate Commerce Act (1887) and the Sherman Anti-
Trust Act (1890) were passed to usher in this era of
regulation ending the long period of limited involvement in
private business dealings. [Ref. 3:p. 28]
This early legislation was intended to provide a degree of
protection to the general public from sharp and unethical
business practices on the part of dominant corporations.
During the first third of the twentieth century however, the
legislation began to shift to promote the general welfare of
the public and to increase the prosperity of the country.
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[Ref. 5:p. 19] The Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC)
was established in 1932 by president Hoover to restore the
economy from the Great Depression. The Corporation had the
backing of Congress and grew to provide many of the functions
of the current Small Business Administration. [Ref. 6:pp. 3-9]
President Franklin D. Roosevelt later provided his support for
the shift as he stated:
In our generation, a new idea has come to dominate thought
about Government— the idea that the resources of the Nation
can be made to produce a far higher standard of living for
the masses if only Government is intelligent and energetic
in giving the right direction to economic life. [Ref. 5:p.
19)
In conjunction with the RFC, additional agencies were
established in support of this notion of advancing national
prosperity and general welfare. The Smaller War Plants
Corporation (SWPC), created by Public Law 603 on July 11,
1942, was the first Government agency to gain the authority to
establish contracts with another Government agency so that it
could award subcontracts to private businesses. It was
established in response to difficulties encountered by small
businessmen in competing for scarce wartime resources. Its
purpose was to mobilize the productive facilities employed by
small businesses to optimize wartime production. The enabling
clause of the law was intended to insure small businesses
would effectively and efficiently be used to produce supplies,
equipment and material for both the war effort and for
requirements in the civilian sector. [Ref. 7:p. 351] In
addition to the authority to establish prime contracts with
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other governmental agencies for the purpose of letting
subcontracts to small companies, the SWPC was also granted the
authority to provide loans to small companies so they could
undertake these subcontracts. Public Law 603 provided the
following language to support the authority for the SWPC:
The Corporation is empowered ...( 4 ) to enter into contracts
with the United States Government and any department,
agency, or offices thereof having procurement powers
obligating the Corporation to furnish articles, equipment,
supplies, or materials to the Government; and (5) to
arrange for the performance of such contracts by letting
subcontracts to small business concerns or others for the
manufacture, supply, or assembly of such articles,
equipment, supplies, or materials, or parts thereof, or
servicing or processing in connection therewith, or such
management services as may be necessary to enable the
Corporation to perform such contracts. [Ref. 7:p. 351]
The SWPC assisted in the award of 58,385 prime contracts worth
$5.7 billion over a three year period which ended in November
of 1945. Additionally, assistance was provided to various
small companies so that they could also obtain over 52,000
subcontracts valued at approximately $30.6 million. Further,
more than 5000 loans to small firms were granted providing
over $500 million to small business enterprises. [Ref. 8:p. 5]
The Corporation did not exercise its authority to act as
prime contractor on many occasions. Only twelve times did it
enter into contracts with other Government agencies. These
contracts resulted in about 260 subcontracts to small
businesses valued at $35.5 million. [Ref. 8:p. 6]
At the end of World War II, the SWPC was abolished since
its role had been conceived to expedite mobilization of the
productive capacity of small companies in support of the war
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effort. It had always been considered a temporary agency.
Its authority and functions were transferred to the Department
of Commerce and the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. [Ref.
8:p. 6]
It became clear that the Government had a substantial role
to fill as the regulator of the economy in the United States.
While the ideal of the 'free market' excluded planning, the
series of economic crises and wars that marked the era had
made planning organizations ... .central to the success of
the American Economy. [Ref. l:p. 57]
Following this line of reasoning, the House and Senate Small
Business Committees, together with the Senate Committee on
Banking and Currency were adamant in the belief that
assurances providing for the welfare of small businesses were
vital to the national defense. They voiced their opinion with
dissatisfaction with the Defense Production Act of 1950 as it
pertained to small business concerns:
Experience under the Defense Production Act has
demonstrated clearly the dangers to our free competitive
economy and to independent small business ... .Constant
vigilance must be exercised of all officials carrying out
the program, to prevent undue concentration of industry and
to prevent injury or destruction to innumerable independent
small enterprises which frequently are less able to shift
to defense production and less able to take care of
themselves in a disturbed and partly controlled
economy ... .Small business must be given a fair chance to
bid or negotiate on procurement contracts; small business
must receive fair consideration in the handling of
applications for accelerated tax amortization and loans
under title III of the act, small business must be fairly
represented in the agencies administering the act and on
advisory committees in those agencies, and the orders and
regulations must provide for fair treatment and a fair
distribution of materials for small business. . .Without this
vigilant attention to the needs of small business, the
mobilization program will suffer, their skilled labor force
and managerial talents may be dissipated, and the
11
contribution which could be made by thousands of energetic
and capable businesses would be lost. Equally important,
in the long run perhaps more important, is the injury which
will result to our free competitive economy unless small
business receives full and fair consideration in all
aspects of the mobilization program and is permitted to
make its full contribution to the defense program. [Ref.
9:pp. 1597-1600]
Amendments sponsored by the House Small Business Committee to
the Defense Production Act passed in 1951 established the
Small Defense Plants Administration. The SDPA was given
identical authority relative to taking on prime contracts from
other Federal agencies and subsequently issuing subcontracts
in their performance as was given to the SWPC . [Ref. 10:p.
130] The SDPA did not however, receive the authority to make
loans. This responsibility fell under the purview of the
Reconstruction Finance Corporation. Without the ability to
provide loans to small businesses the SDPA's primary activity
became the issuance of Certificates of Competency. [Ref. 8:pp.
3-7] In the short two year life of the SDPA the authority to
take on prime contracts was exercised only seven times
amounting to subcontracts with a total value of $2.3 million.
[Ref. 8:p. 8]
In 1953 the SDPA and the RFC were abolished by the
Congress with the establishment of the Small Business
Administration (SBA) . The SBA received the authority given to
these two organizations in that it could both enter into prime
contracts with other governmental agencies as well as issue
loans to small businesses. The House Select Committee on
Small Business illustrated the purpose of the SBA:
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That the Government should aid, counsel, assist and protect
insofar as is possible the interest of small business
concerns in order to preserve free competitive enterprise,
to insure that a fair proportion of the total purchases and
contracts for supplies and services for the Government be
placed with small business enterprises, and to maintain and
strengthen the overall economy of the nation. [Ref. 11 :p.
2022]
With the passage of the Small Business Act on July 30, 1953,
President Eisenhower emphasized his commitment to the value of
competition and to the security, welfare and economic
prosperity of the nation. This was illustrated by his
agreement with the primary purpose of the SBA to encourage and
develop both the actual as well as the potential capacity of
small business to promote economic well being and realize
national security. Section 8(a) of the Small Business Act
provided the authority for the SBA to enter into prime
contracts with other Government agencies thereby providing the
SBA with the wherewithal to carry out its mission. The
language contained in section 8(a) of the Small Business Act
stated
:
(a) It shall be the duty of the Administration and it is
hereby empowered, whenever it determines such action is
necessary . .
.
( 1 ) to enter into contracts with the United States
Government and any department, agency, or officer
thereof having procurement powers obligating the
Administration to furnish articles, equipment,
supplies, or materials to the Government. In any case
in which the Administration certifies to any officer of
the Government having procurement powers that the
Administration is competent to perform any specific
Government procurement contract to be let by any such
officer, such officer shall be authorized in his
discretion to let such procurement contract to the
Administration and the procurement officer; and
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(2) to arrange for the performance of such contracts by
negotiating or otherwise letting subcontracts to small
business concerns or others for the manufacture,
supply, or assembly of such articles, equipment,
supplies, or materials or parts thereof, or servicing
or processing in connection therewith, or such
management services as may be necessary to enable the
Administration to perform such contracts. [Ref. 12 :p.
186]
Initially, the SBA did not exercise the authority given it
by section 8(a). The section was viewed as a tool to be used
in emergency situations:
If all else fails, the administration may act as prime
contractor itself. It is empowered to enter into contracts
with other agencies of the Government having procurement
authority and to circulate these contracts to small
business firms... It is not expected that this power will be
used extensively. It should, in fact, be employed only as
a last resort. [Ref. 13:pp. 84-85]
The SBA felt that as long as a fair portion of the contracts
generated by the Government were going to small businesses the
legislation would not have to be expressly implemented. In
1958 the SBA declared that the authority to act as prime
contractor was being officially placed on a standby basis.
The authority was to be activated only in the event of an
emergency situation. Additionally, the SBA stated that
subcontracts issued under the authority of section 8(a) would
be accomplished via solicited competitions and under standard
procurement regulations. [Ref. 14:p. 12] Between 1958 and
1968 the 8(a) authority went unused and no mention of it
appeared in the official reports of the SBA during the period.
The prototype of the present day 8(a) program was
initially formulated under the Johnson Administration in 1968
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to increase employment in the ghetto area of Watts in Los
Angeles, California after the rioting of the mid sixties. The
SBA awarded contracts to small minority companies in the Watts
area, however, it did not reference section 8(a) in doing so.
This activity of making noncompetitive awards did not have a
statutory basis, but the SBA decided to ignore the provisions
requiring solicited competition in these cases. [Ref. 15:p.
K-3] The House Select Committee on Small Business became
concerned due to complaints received that contracts which had
been competed between small businesses were now being given on
a noncompetitive basis to minority owned businesses under the
8(a) program. Although there was some disagreement within the
committee regarding the statutory requirements, all agreed
that the 8(a) program should not be used to take contracts
away from other small businesses. [Ref. 16:pp. 15-38]
It became clear that if minority concerns were to be
adequately represented by the SBA, statutory support would be
needed. A series of Executive Orders were issued to provide
assistance to minority enterprises.
Executive Order 11458 of 5 March 1969 established the
Office of Minority Business Enterprise to coordinate plans,
programs and operations within the Federal Government to
contribute to the establishment, preservation and
strengthening of minority owned businesses. All agencies of
the Federal Government were to assist in the development of
self-sustained minority business enterprises. [Ref. 17 :p. 1]
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Executive Order 11518 of 20 March 1970 provided that
special emphasis should be granted within Federal departments
and agencies as well as within the SBA to minority owned
businesses. It indicated that particular consideration should
be given relative to their needs in seeking entrance into the
business community. [Ref. 18:p. 1]
Executive Order 11625 of 13 October 1971 prescribed
further guidance in the development and coordination of a
national program aimed at assisting minority owned businesses.
Federal agencies were directed to foster minority business
enterprise and to support ongoing Federal Government efforts
in this area because:
The opportunity for full participation in our free
enterprise system by socially and economically
disadvantaged persons is essential if we are to obtain
social and economic justice for such persons and improve
the functioning of our national economy. [Ref. 19:p. 1]
With these orders the president clearly indicated the
direction the SBA was to take regarding assistance to minority
owned firms. In the following years, however, Congress became
dissatisfied with the lack of specificity and statutory
authority resident in the guidance and with the resulting
increased dependence on Government contracts minority owned
firms developed due to the program. Public Law 95-507 was
passed in October of 1978 to clarify the program's eligibility
rights and to set forth the policy that:
No small business concerns shall be deemed eligible for
8(a) program assistance unless SBA determines that, with
contract, financial, technical, and managerial support, the
small businesses will be able to perform contracts and have
16
reasonable prospects for success in competing in the
private sector. [Ref. 20:p. 14]
Public Law 96-481, passed on 21 October 1980, required the SBA
to establish graduation dates for each company enrolled in the
8(a) program to clarify in greater detail that the program was
designed to assist and develop minority owned enterprises to
the point where they could compete in the procurement
mainstream.
The terms of participation and the specific details of the
8(a) program have most recently been modified by the Business
Opportunity Development Reform Act in November of 1988 (Public
Law 100-656) and later by the Business Opportunity Development
Act Technical Corrections Act in June of 1989 (Public Lav: 101-
37). The Small Business Act and the 8(a) program in effect
today have taken many years to evolve into their current form.
An overview of the current 8(a) program follows to describe
the environment contracting officers and minority businessmen
work together in today.
B. AN OVERVIEW OF THE CURRENT 8(A) PROGRAM
The scope of the current regulations relative to the 8(a)
program are put forth in 13 CFR section 124 with the following
language
:
Sections 8(a) and 7 ( j ) of the Small Business Act establish
the Minority Small Business and Capital Ownership
Development Program or 8(a) Program. The 8(a) Program is
intended to be used exclusively for business development
purposes to help small businesses owned and controlled by
socially and economically disadvantaged individuals,
economically disadvantaged Indian tribes. . .to compete on an
17
equal basis in the mainstream of the American economy.
[Ref. 21:p. 422]
The purpose of the program, to assist in the development of
minority owned firms, is supported by section 8(a) of the
Small Business Act as follows:
Section 8(a) authorizes SBA to enter into all types of
contracts, including, but not limited to, contracts for
supplies, services, construction, research and development
with other Government departments and agencies and to
subcontract the performance of these contracts to small
business concerns owned and controlled by socially and
economically disadvantaged individuals, Indian tribes or
Hawaiian Native Organizations. [Ref. 21:p. 423]
Section 124 of 13 CFR spans 66 pages detailing the particular
definitions, procedures and requirements of the 8(a) program.
The information which bears most significance has been summed
up in a series of fact sheets published by the SBA which are
made available to prospective businesses to provide key
information without the legal jargon of the CFR. Fact sheet
number 20 describes the Development Assistance 7(j) Program
which authorizes the SBA to provide grants or loans to
eligible recipients including "SBA's 8(a) certified firms,
socially and/or economically disadvantaged individuals and/or
firms and individuals or firms located in areas of high
unemployment." [Ref. 22]
Fact sheet number 36 briefly outlines the 8(a) Program in
easy to follow terms. The purpose and eligibility
requirements of the program as they appear on the fact sheet
are partially reproduced herein as follows:
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PURPOSE
The purpose of the 8(a) Program is to:
(1) Foster business ownership by individuals who are
socially and economically disadvantaged.
(2) Promote the competitive viability of such firms by
providing such a viable contract, financial, technical and
management assistance as may be necessary.
(3) Clarify and expand the program for the procurement by
the United States of articles, equipment, supplies,
service, materials, and construction work from small
business concerns owned by socially and economically
disadvantaged individuals.
ELIGIBILITY
Applicants for 8(a) Program participation must meet certain
program requirements which include...
1. Ownership: In order to be eligible to participate in
the 8(a) Program, an applicant concern must be one which is
at least 51 percent owned by an individual ( s ) who is a
citizen of the United States .. .determined to be socially
and economically disadvantaged.
2. Social Disadvantage: Socially disadvantaged
individuals are those who have been subjected to racial or
ethnic prejudice or cultural bias because of their identity
as a member of a group without regard to their individual
qualities . .
.
3. Economic Disadvantage: Economically disadvantaged
individuals are socially disadvantaged individuals whose
ability to compete in the free enterprise system has been
impaired due to diminished capital and credit
opportunities, as compared to others in the same or similar
line of business and competitive market area who are not
socially disadvantaged...
4. Control and Management: An applicant concern's
management and daily business operations must be controlled
by an individual ( s ) determined to be socially and
economically disadvantaged, and such individual ( s ) must be
engaged in the daily management and operation of the
business concern... [Ref. 23]
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Other details which are considered to be of particular
importance which are not contained in the fact sheet have been
summarized from 13 CFR section 124:
• Applicants for the program must demonstrate that they
have been in business in the primary industry
classification in which they seek 8(a) certification
for two full years.
• Once a disadvantaged individual or the business concern
he represents has exited the program due to
termination, graduation, voluntary withdrawal or
expiration of program term, he is not eligible to
reapply for program participation.
• Each small business certified for program participation
on or after 15 November, 1988, is subject to a program
term of nine years from the date of certification. The
program term consists of two stages, the developmental
stage and the transitional stage.
• To remain eligible for the program an individual's net
worth cannot exceed $500,000 in the developmental stage
or $750,000 in the transitional stage. As part of the
annual review participants must submit eligibility
certificates, personal financial statements and a
record of all payments.
• Participants must provide an updated business plan
annually which outlines business targets, objectives
and goals. The plan must contain an analysis of market
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potential; an analysis of the participant's strengths
and weaknesses; specific targets, objectives and goals
for the next two years and estimates of anticipated
awards regarding both 8(a) and non-8 (a) contracts.
• The SBA is authorized to provide financial assistance
for skills training by paying the costs of training or
upgrading of employees or potential employees of 8(a)
concerns
.
• Although contracts in the 8(a) arena are normally
awarded on a sole source, noncompetitive basis,
competition thresholds do exist. If a contract
designated for the program has an anticipated award
price exceeding $5,000,000 for contracts assigned
Manufacturing Standard Industrial Classification codes,
or $3,000,000 for all other contracts, it will be
competed among eligible 8(a) program participants.
• Participating firms must make substantial and sustained
efforts to meet the non-8 (a) contract targets of the
business plan during the developmental stage. Firms
must use the following table during the transitional
stage to meet non-8 (a) contract activity targets:








Failure to meet these targets could result in remedial
action such as requiring the participant to obtain
managerial and technical training; conditioning the
award of future 8(a) contracts on meeting the targets;
reducing or eliminating sole source 8(a) contracts or
program termination.
• Upon determining that an 8(a) firm should be graduated
from the program, the SBA must notify the participant
of its intent to graduate the firm in writing. The
letter will outline the basis for the determination and
will provide the participant 45 days to submit in
writing any reason why the basis for graduating the
firm is not warranted. [Ref. 2 1 :pp. 436-468
]
It is clear that the 8(a) program is here to stay.
Contracting officers must utilize minority owned businesses
through the SBA for designated contracts. It is therefore
essential that the program produce successful contract actions
so that the procuring agency of the Government can receive the
products it requires and that minority owned businesses can
succeed and graduate from the program and stand alone to
operate without preferential assistance from the SBA.
The program has received mixed reviews over its tenure.
The WEDTECH scandal is well known as a major catastrophe of
the program. This small, minority owned South Bronx machine
tool company won $250 million in sole source, noncompetitive
defense contracts under the program largely via payoffs and
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bribery. [Ref. 24 :p. 34] Shoddy workmanship and corrupt
management eventually led the company into bankruptcy, but on
the way they delivered faulty equipment to the Defense
Department behind schedule and at extremely inflated costs.
[Ref. 25:pp. 45-46] There are other problems associated with
the 8(a) program as well. A careful examination of these
problems can illustrate steps the Government can take to avoid
difficulties in contract performance, prevent defaults and
insure that scandals such as WEDTECH are a thing of the past.
C. SOME PROBLEMS WITH 8(A)
The General Accounting Office (GAO) published a report for
the House Committee on Government Operations on 24 May 1988
entitled "Status, Operations, and Views on the 8(a)
Procurement Program" in which it suggests that the program has
done "too much for too few for too long." [Ref. 26 :p. 1] The
report addressed four key areas of the program: (1) a
statistical overview of the program's participants, (2)
concentration of contracting activity, (3) preparation of
firms for the competitive market, and (4) adequacy of the
SBA's administration and monitoring of the program.
Additionally, GAO made a determination regarding how well 8(a)
firms have met contract terms and conditions. Their findings
are summarized from the report:
• Procurements from 8(a) contracts represented between
1.1 and 1.8 percent of total federal procurements in
the six years ending 30 September 1987.
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• From the program's beginning in 1968 through the end of
fiscal year 1987, 1,287 firms had graduated from the
program. Of these, 76 percent had graduated between
1985 and 1987. This concentration of graduates is due
to Public Law 96-481 which required the SBA to
establish graduation dates for each firm.
Additionally, as of 30 September 1987, 72 percent of
the participating firms had been in the program five
years or less. These statistics indicate a high recent
turnover rate in the program.
• Contracting activity was found to be highly
concentrated. In 1987, the top 50 firms received 35
percent of the total dollar value of 8(a) contracts
awarded. On the other hand, 39 percent of the active
8(a) firms did not receive any 8(a) contracts that
year, and 17 percent received $100,000 or less in 8(a)
business. "In other words, over 55 percent of the
active 8(a) firms received less than 1 percent of the
8(a) business, and less than 2 percent of the firms
received over 35 percent of the 8(a) business."
• The review indicated that 8(a) firms were not being
prepared for the competitive market. Nearly one third
of the firms that graduated between October 1982 and
February 1986 were no longer in business. In response
to a questionnaire, 58 percent of 8(a) business owners
indicated that graduation from the program had a
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devastating effect on their business. Regarding the
firms who had been in the program for seven years,
which at the time of the report was their last year of
eligibility, 8(a) sales represented at least 90 percent
of the revenue for 30 percent of the firms; 52-87
percent of the revenue for 42 percent of the firms; and
less than 50 percent of the revenue for only 28
percent of the firms. Another indicator that self
sufficiency was not being developed came from the sales
growth of 10 of the top 50 firms enrolled in the 8(a)
program in the five years before the end of fiscal year
1987. Over 75 percent of the growth of these firms
came from 8(a) sales. "Collectively, the 10 firms'
dependency on 8(a) sales decreased from an average 82.6
percent to 81.3 percent during the five year period.
Individually, however, six of the ten firms were more
8(a) dependent in their last year."
• The GAO contended that the SBA's procedures for
encouraging non-8 (a) business and developing 8(a) firms
into self sufficient enterprises were not being
complied with. The GAO found that the files at the SBA
did not indicate that required annual reviews had been
conducted in 108 of 142 firms. The files did not
contain evidence that required site visits were made
for 122 of the 142 firms. The files also did not
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contain evidence that required annual financial
statements were received for 57 of the 142 firms.
• In response to these and other findings, the SBA
indicated that district offices do not have the staff
necessary to conduct all required reviews and site
visits. The SBA contended that the files do not
adequately represent the extent of SBA contact with
8(a) firms and that the interests of 8(a) firms take
precedence over strict adherence to 8(a) support
requirements
.
• The GAO report found that in general 8(a) firms who
received awards under the program performed
satisfactorily. This determination was based on a mail
survey of Federal contracting officers administering
478 open and 366 closed 8(a) contracts. The survey
indicated that for about 85 percent of the contracts,
8(a) firms performed as well as non-8 (a) small
businesses, but that about 37 percent of these
contracts were judged to be more costly to the
Government. One half of the contracting officers
surveyed indicated that 8(a) firms required more or
much more monitoring than non-8 (a) firms, while the
other half indicated 8(a) firms required similar
monitoring as other firms. [Ref. 22:pp. 10-25]
The concentration of contracting activity; the
preparation of firms for the competitive market and the
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adequacy of the SBA's monitoring of the program are
areas on which the SBA must focus its attention to
resolve. The contracting officer must focus on
contract administration once an award has been made by
the SBA to ensure successful contract completion.
Using hindsight, a close examination of the causes of
contract default can reveal the indicators which signal
that difficulties in performance are occurring which
could lead to default. Once these indicators have been
identified, corrective action can be initiated by the
contracting officer administering the contract to
resolve the difficulties and prevent potential default.
A review of six contracts between MCLB Albany, GA and
minority owned firms follows to illustrate in specific
terms the causes and indicators of contract performance
difficulties encountered in recent contracts as well as
the steps available to alleviate them.
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III. CONTRACT CASE SUMMARIES
A . INTRODUCTION
The following cases have been summarized based upon
information obtained from research conducted at MCLB Albany,
GA during the week of 7-12 July 1991. Although the names of
contractors in these cases have been changed, and
modifications made where necessary due to pending litigation
or termination negotiations, these cases represent current and
factual contract situations. The information was compiled
from the contracts themselves, attachments and memorandums
appended to them as well as from interviews with cognizant
contracting personnel familiar with the details and
circumstances associated with the contracts. Each summary
follows the same basic format as follows:
• AN OUTLINE OF THE REQUIREMENT CONTRACTED FOR
• A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE CONTRACTOR ( S
)
• A SUMMARY OF THE DETAILS OF THE CONTRACT ( S
)
• A SUMMARY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES ASSOCIATED WITH THE
PERFORMANCE OF THE CONTRACT ( S
)
• AN IDENTIFICATION OF THE SPECIFIC CAUSE (S) OF DEFAULT
• A SUMMARY OF THE INDICATORS WHICH WERE OBSERVABLE DURING
PERFORMANCE WHICH PRECEDED THE PENDING DEFAULT
• A SET OF RECOMMENDATIONS WHICH COULD HAVE BEEN
TAKEN TO ALLEVIATE THE DIFFICULTIES
In most cases the writer believes it is extremely probable
that the recommended actions would have resulted in successful
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contract actions, had they been implemented appropriately and
in a timely manner.
Table I below describes the cases which follow to
illustrate which requirements are associated with a particular
contractor. Two contractors listed for a single requirement
is an indication that the first contractor listed failed to
complete the contract and the second contractor was awarded a
subsequent contract for the same requirement. More than one
requirement associated with one contractor is an indication































This contract was initiated to upgrade the computer system
used in the office of the project manager for training devices
(PM TRADE). The system being utilized was technologically
antiquated, slow and not user friendly. As a consequence it
was underutilized and lacked the capacity to provide optimal
project management support. The statement of work required
Mendon Industries to evaluate the system in place and develop
a more effective and efficient system, place it in service and
provide a 90 day demonstration and evaluation period. The new
system had interface, capacity and speed requirements detailed
in the specifications and had to contain a user friendly
tutorial package. This effort was to be implemented in the
offices of three project directors as a prototype system with
the potential for implementation throughout PM TRADE.
THE CONTRACTOR
Mendon Industries is a minority owned firm based in Falls
Church, Virginia with a branch office in Clearwater, Florida
where this contract was to be performed. Mendon Industries
had previously demonstrated managerial competency and
technical ability to both the Small Business Administration
and other Government agencies from whom it had previously
received contracts, thereby earning a reputation as a reliable
and capable firm. As a result, the company received a
significant amount of business under the 8(a) program. This
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particular contract was relatively small in monetary terms in
comparison with the company's other Government work, which
came from a variety of Federal agencies, however the contract
option for wholesale implementation of the system made the
contract particularly attractive to the company. The firm
was capable in areas such as software development and
management, ADPE configuration management, systems interface




A Firm Fixed Price contract was issued in the amount of
$94,276 in March of 1990. This price was negotiated from the
contractor's original proposal of $136,567. The contract
contained an option for installation ^throughout PM TRADE
amounting to $4.5 million. The original discussions between
the technical representatives at PM TRADE and the contractor's
engineers and contracting personnel were conducted assuming a
proposed Time and Materials contract with relatively
imprecise specifications would be issued. Shortly before the
negotiations however, the specifications were rewritten in
sufficient detail to allow for the utilization of a Firm Fixed




At the time this contract was issued, MCLB Albany, GA had
another active contract with Mendon Industries and had
experienced previous successful dealings with the company.
Contract costs tended to grow with this company as the
preceding Time and Materials contracts progressed because the
company was able to expend more costs in contract performance
due to the vague and imprecise language contained in the
specifications. The Government had not been able to
accurately definitize the specifications in earlier and
pending contracts. In this contract, however, in an attempt
to effectively control costs, great care was taken to
definitize and precisely structure the specifications,
effectively limiting the contractor to the price agreed upon.
The contractor had initially drafted his proposal for another
Time and Materials contract for the system which would have
provided him a significant degree of program flexibility, but
when given a fixed price requirement, the company lost this
flexibility and did not adequately adjust the price for the
increased risk associated with a Firm Fixed Price contract.
As the contractor completed initial preparations to begin
working on this contract it was evident that the negotiated
price was insufficient and that profits would be minimal or a
moderate loss could occur. Additionally, options for other
Government work were subsequently exercised which effectively
maximized the productive capacity of the firm. As a result,
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Mendon Industries failed to initiate the project by the start
of work date. In the weeks that followed, progress reports
lacked concreteness and specific milestone attainment status.
The contracting officer's technical representatives indicated
that the reports contained data which were based on
projections and planned activities with no substance. After
60 days, the contracting officer called a meeting with the
contractor to discuss the lack of significant progress on the
project. At this meeting the contractor presented vague
generalities and elaborate graphics of planned implementations
and improved technology without specific accomplishments.
After the meeting the contractor was given 30 days to make
substantial progress. After 30 days when no progress was
apparent, the contracting officer notified Mendon Industries
of their default status and that the options on this and other
pending contracts would not be exercised.
It was clear that the company had the ability to perform
this contract, but was overcommitted to other Government work.
This contract represented minimal profits or a potential loss
so the contractor hoped for a Termination for Convenience,
and to renegotiate a subsequent contract that would
incorporate technological improvements in the specifications.
The contracting officer became aware of the contractor's
desires but felt that completion of this contract was in the
best interest of the Government. A 90 day extension was
negotiated, with the improvements cited above provided as
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consideration. Mendon Industries devoted sufficient resources
to make minor progress on the contract, but still failed to
meet the delivery schedule as modified. The company was
clearly in a default status at this point in time, however the
contracting officer believed continuation of this contract was
in the best interest of the Government. Two additional 90 day
extensions were necessary and aggressive technical
representative monitoring was instituted to insure adequate
completion. Additional consideration was provided in the form
of increased processing speed and an additional 60 day
evaluation period of the prototype system. Although this
contract was not terminated, the additional costs from delay
and excessive contract administration made this a difficult
and burdensome program to manage for the Government and an
unprofitable endeavor for the contractor.
THE CAUSES OF DIFFICULTIES
This small company did not have experience in Firm Fixed
Price contracting. The proposal which was submitted and the
agreement which was negotiated did not provide for the actual
costs incurred. The company was not prepared for the
restrictive price of a Firm Fixed Price contract and was
overcommitted . With options pending on other Government
contracts so close to the start date of this contract, the
company assumed a great deal of risk by accepting this
contract. Furthermore, Mendon Industries did not have the
financial or personnel resources to perform all of its requirements.
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THE INDICATORS
There were two indicators that the proposal was not
carefully drafted. The first was that the price for the Firm
Fixed Price contract was the same as that planned for the Time
and Materials contract. Secondly, after the change from Time
and Materials to Firm Fixed Price, the new proposal was
submitted in less than one week. The contractor had not been
exposed to Firm Fixed Price contracts for this type of work
and did not take the time needed to fully assess the rigorous
price aspect and risk associated with the Firm Fixed Price
contract
.
The overcommitment of the company's resources was
indicated in three ways. The first was the late start on the
project. This was followed by the incomplete and insufficient
progress reports which contained technical language without
specific accomplishments. The third indicator, again related
to the first two, was the vague responses given by the
contractor at the meeting called by the contracting officer
after the initial 60 days of contract performance.
RECOMMENDED ACTIONS
Although the contract was ultimately performed, extensive
effort was required on the part of the contracting officer and
the contractor. A more thorough examination of the
contractor's workload prior to award could have resulted in an
award to another capable firm which would have successfully
performed the contract. The requirements of the statement of
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work were not extremely difficult; many other 8(a) firms were
qualified to perform them. Pre-award actions could have
prevented post-award difficulties.
With respect to the proposal, the contracting officer
should have recognized the increased risk in Firm Fixed Price
contract performance and negotiated a more fair and reasonable
price to alleviate some of the risk of loss for the
contractor. This increased funding incentive would probably
have encouraged Mendon Industries to devote its assets to this
contract in a more timely manner. The contracting officer
should have also extended the solicitation period and
encouraged the contractor to reevaluate his proposal in light
of the new contract type.
Action on the lack of progress should have been initiated
earlier. By waiting 60 days the Government relinquished some
of its rights associated with requiring the contractor to
strictly conform to the schedule. This initial period
indicated that the Government would not require the contractor
to rigidly meet the milestones of the schedule. With this
precedence set, the contract was subject to multiple
extensions with little consideration. Had pressure been
applied early in this contract a more substantial portion of
the company's resources would probably have been devoted to




The two contracts described below were entered into to
acquire a total of 7939 AN/PRC-68A radio sets. This radio is
a small, hand-held, short range VHF-FM receiver /transmitter
used by United States Department of Defense forces for small
unit (squad/platoon level) command and control. The 68A
version is a product improvement model of the original AN/PRC-
68 radio set. The requirement for these radio sets represents
the quantity required to outfit the prepositioned war reserves
(PWR) at MCLB Albany, GA and to complete the outfitting of
active Marine forces with the improved model radio.
THE CONTRACTORS
Towson Electronics is a minority owned firm located in
Baltimore, Maryland. The company lacked experience in
contracting for military requirements, which require an
approved quality assurance plan and a communications security
(COMSEC) material systems account. The performance of this
contract required the obtainment of these things as well as
extensive tooling, special test equipment and other Government
Furnished Equipment (GFE). Further, the contractor needed to
expand his capacity to perform this contract.
Oklahoma Radio is another minority owned firm located near
McAlester, Oklahoma. The contractor's business base is
heavily dependent on Government contracts, both competitively
won and issued under the 8(a) program. Commercial contracting
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activity represented only a minor and insignificant portion of
the firm's efforts. The company had historically been
extremely dependent on progress payments and had been
marginally solvent throughout its 20 year history. Despite
these financial weaknesses the company maintained exceptional
quality control and produced excellent products. The owners
of Oklahoma Radio regularly replaced the upper level
management after short periods of time. Six months to one
year had been standard tenure for these officials. In 1989
after significant losses were reported on the financial
statements, the company reorganized and sold stock to its
employees making it an 85% employee owned enterprise and
postponed the firm's subsequent bankruptcy until May of 1991.
THE CONTRACTS
In September of 1986 a $4 million Firm Fixed Price
contract was awarded to Oklahoma Radio by Headquarters, United
States Marine Corps ( HQMC ) for 3081 AN/PRC-68A radio sets.
The contract contained an option to purchase an additional
3500 radio sets in the following year.
In April of 1989 a $1.9 million Firm Fixed Price contract
was awarded to Towson Electronics for 1257 AN/PRC-68A radio
sets to satisfy additional requirements which arose after the
Oklahoma Radio contract and to establish a second source to
enhance logistical support and increase industrial
preparedness, thereby promoting combat readiness. This
contract was also awarded by HQMC. Subsequent to the award of
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this contract both contracts were transferred to MCLB Albany,
GA on 9 May, 1989.
THE TOWSON ELECTRONICS SITUATION
Although awarded after the Oklahoma Radio contract, an
examination of the Towson Electronics contract first is
appropriate since after default the requirement for the 1257
radio sets was awarded to Oklahoma Radio in addition to its
already existing contract and options.
First article testing of the radio sets from Towson
Electronics was scheduled to commence 180 days after contract
award. Since the radio set had been in production for three
years, the manufacturing requirements were very
straightforward posing minimal risk for the contractor.
Production deliveries were required nine months after first
article test approval. This represented a realistic schedule
for both the contractor and the Government. The contractor
was initially required to obtain a COMSEC account number
within 45 days after contract award, however this time frame
was revised to 90 days at the 14 June 1989 post-award
conference. The contractor was also required to have an
approved quality assurance plan within 30 days after contract
award (24 May 1989) .
After the post-award conference on 14 June 1989 a
technical representative from the weapon system manager's
office gained access to the production facility in use by
Towson Electronics for the AN/PRC-68A radio sets. This
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particular facility contained no tooling, machinery,
materials, vendor parts or other indication that production
was underway or even planned. At this point it was evident
that the contractor would probably not meet the scheduled
first article test date.
On 9 August 1989 the contract administrator at Towson
Electronics informed the contracting officer at MCLB Albany,
GA that the DCASMA, Baltimore quality assurance representative
(QAR) had rejected the contractor's quality assurance plan
ten days earlier on 30 June 1989. According to the Towson
Electronics contract administrator, the QAR stated that the
inspection requirement included in the statement of work (SOW)
differed from that shown on the contract data requirements
list (CDRL), and until this discrepancy was resolved, there
would be no Government review of the plan.
On 16 August 1989 the quality assurance manager at Towson
Electronics wanted to review the parts lists and drawings
which were provided to the contractor upon award of the
contract. On 18 August 1989 Towson Electronics asked for
authorization to obtain the tooling required by the contract.
The company was informed that the contract was the necessary
authorization to obtain the tooling.
On 23 August 1989 the ACO informed MCLB Albany, GA that
a DCASMA, Baltimore team had visited the Towson plant on 9
August 1989 and was concerned about the status of the
contractor's performance. The ACO indicated that Towson
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Electronics had not yet placed any orders for parts; the
schedule for first article test was in serious jeopardy and
the contractor had not yet obtained a COMSEC materials account
number. Two days later the ACO called back and indicated that
the contractor still did not have an approved quality
assurance system in place and that there was no production in
process in the plant on any Government contracts.
A Cure Notice was issued on 30 August 1989 based on
anticipatory repudiation of the contract for the following
reasons: (1) no orders had been placed for vendor parts; (2)
notification by the contractor to the ACO that the first
article test date would be delayed; (3) the contractor did not
have an approved quality assurance system in place and (4) the
contractor had not yet obtained a COMSEC materials account
number. The contractor responded to the Cure Notice on 5
September 1989. Statements made by the contractor as a result
of the Cure Notice and the Government's responses were as
follows
:
Contractor: Necessary changes to the contract were identified
at the post-award conference (PAC) and the contractor was
advised not to proceed until the contract had been modified.
Government: Changes discussed at the PAC involved an
extension in the due date of the COMSEC account number from 45
to 90 days after contract award and changes to the data list
addressees due to the change in procuring offices. These
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changes were all minor and had no impact on the contractor's
progress. The contractor was not directed to not proceed.
Contractor: The DCASMA Baltimore QAR had refused to review
CDRL item B001, quality assurance plan, due to the discrepancy
between the SOW and the CDRL.
Government: MCLB Albany, GA was not notified of this fact
until 9 August 1989, and CDRL item B001 was due 24 May 1989.
Contractor: Towson Electronics encountered problems in
obtaining the special tooling from vendors.
Government: MCLB Albany, GA was not informed there was a
problem until 18 August 1989, (almost four months after
contract award). Letters were issued by the PCO dated January
1988, in the solicitation phase of the procurement,
authorizing the special tooling vendors to provide quotes to
potential bidders since the tooling was to be Government
property. The contractor needed the quotes from these vendors
in order to prepare his bid or should have put the Government
on notice immediately that there continued to be a problem.
Contractor: Only two orders for parts were submitted due to
the special tooling problem.
Government: The contractor stated in the pre-award survey
(PAS) that they would order all materials for the contract at
one time upon award of the contract. They have not complied
with this statement. Giving the special tooling problem as a
reason for not doing so is not valid. All material required
on this contract is not special tooling. Additionally, the
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contractor did not provide notice of any problem with
materials until four months after contract award.
Contractor: The Government furnished equipment (GFE) radios
were not delivered on time, and were the wrong configuration.
Government: The GFE radios were received by the contractor on
31 May 1989 (seven days past the due date). The contractor
was never instructed to use these radios for configuration
guidance as the technical data package (TDP) governs
configuration. The GFE radios were subsequently replaced by
the latest version currently being produced under another
contract at the request of the program manager, for
informational purposes only. The new radios had absolutely no
impact whatsoever on configuration, nor did they effect the
contractor's manufacturing or purchasing processes.
Contractor: A long and tedious process of configuration
identification had to take place prior to placing orders for
material
.
Government: A competent bidder would have thoroughly reviewed
the TDP prior to submitting its bid, not after contract award.
Contractor: Material leadtimes precluded the contractor from
being able to meet the first article test schedule.
Government: Leadtimes were known at the time of the PAS. The
contractor had stated all materials would be purchased upon
contract award, and the Government was not notified in a
timely manner of any problem affecting vendor parts.
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Contractor: The Chief Executive Officer of Towson Electronics
submitted the company's application for the COMSEC account
number on 18 May 1989.
Government: The COMSEC account number has still not been
issued in accordance with the requirements of the contract.
Contractor: The DCAS QAR cannot complete the review process
of their quality assurance system because they are not in a
production mode.
Government: The contractor should already have been in
production of the ten first article test units prior to
submission of their quality assurance plan, in accordance
with their own milestone schedule.
The contract was terminated for default on 22 September
1989 for the reasons set forth in the Cure Notice.
Termination negotiations found the contractor at fault, but
lack of timely action on the part of the Government in
conjunction with extensive petitioning from Towson
Electronics' legal counsel regarding the circumstances noted
in the response to the Cure Notice prompted the Government to
convert to a Termination for Convenience in January 1990.
THE OKLAHOMA RADIO SITUATION
The following represents the major awards/options
exercised relative to this contract:
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DATE QTY/CUM QTY DOLLAR VALUE/CUM TOTAL
SEPTEMBER 1986 3081/3081 4M/4M
MARCH 1987 3500/6581 3.7M/7.7M
OCTOBER 1989 1257/7838 1.9M/9.6M
FEBRUARY 1990 101/7939 .3M/9.9M
ECP'S AND SPARES . 3M/10.2M
1990-1991
The original award of 3081 in September, 1986 was followed by
exercising the option for 3500 on the same contract in March,
1987. The contract for the 1257 from Towson Electronics was
awarded in October, 1989 followed by an additional award of
101 in February of 1990. Additional requirements raised the
value of the contract to $10.2 million for 7939 radio sets.
Prior to May, 1989, before this contract was transferred
to MCLB ALBANY, GA the contractor had made significant
progress early in the performance period. First article
testing was conducted on time with excellent quality noted by
the inspectors. The performance of the contractor in the
first 180 days of the contract was sufficient to justify the
exercising of the option contained in the original contract
for an additional 3500 radio sets. Throughout 1987 and 1988
and until April of 1989 the contract progressed satisfactorily
with minor discussions and administrative changes. The
company had experienced financial difficulties throughout its
history, but had performed this contract according to the
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terms and conditions. Progress payments of 90% were being
made based on the contract completion status.
In April of 1989 the Dallas DCAS office informed HQMC and
Oklahoma Radio that deficiencies existed in the contractor's
accounting system relative to isolation of cost data and
recommended that progress payments be suspended until the
discrepancies were resolved. The contract was transferred to
MCLB Albany, GA the following month with this recommendation.
Oklahoma Radio informed MCLB Albany, GA that they had changed
management and reorganized to become an employee-owned firm
and was eager to continue this thus far successful contract.
It later became apparent that the reorganization was needed
since employees had not been paid because of accounting system
discrepancies that failed to isolate all costs of production
resulting in no available funds to pay the employees once the
manufacturing costs were met. The employees were satisfied
with stock in the company in lieu of wages due. The
deficiencies in the cost accounting system can be illustrated
by the two examples that follow. The first is that the
original manufacturer of the AN/PRC-68 radio set, Magnavox,
charged the Government an average unit price of $1887 per
radio set. The proposal from Oklahoma Radio contained an
average unit price of $1079 per radio set. The DCAA auditors
determined that the radio sets could be produced and sold
under ideal manufacturing conditions for $1298 per radio set,
which was the price awarded to Towson Electronics in the
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original contract. Secondly, Oklahoma Radio submitted a $1.5
million claim relating to discrepancies in the technical data
package, however, only $600,000 could be substantiated. The
company withdrew the claim after it was audited and submitted
Engineering Change Proposals (ECP) valued at only $300,000.
Oklahoma Radio received the $300,000, however, the company
could have resubmitted the claim to receive the previously
substantiated $600,000.
Through the end of 1989 and until March of 1990 the
contractor continued to deliver radio sets on a reasonably
satisfactory schedule. When deliveries were discontinued
after March of 1990, due to the deteriorating financial
conditions, the company negotiated with several outside
funding sources for financial assistance. The lack of
deliveries pushed the contract into a default status in April
of 1990 bringing about a series of negotiations between the
Government and the contractor until May of 1991. Progress
payments were not suspended until 14 May, 1991 after $7.5
million had been paid to Oklahoma Radio. The contractor had
delivered 4074 of the 7939 radio sets that were due by this
date. The Termination for Default notice was signed on 20 May
1991 and delivered personally to the Chief Executive Officer
of Oklahoma Radio on 22 May 1991. Oklahoma Radio filed for
bankruptcy on 22 May 1991. Since then, the GFE in the plant
has been inventoried and containerized. The termination
negotiations are still in process, however it is unlikely that
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Oklahoma Radio will avoid dissolution. The loss of this
minority owned small business is tragic for the employees of
the company, who have no other employment opportunities in the
area, and the dissolution of the company also represents a
loss of a valuable source of well made equipment for the
Government
.
THE CAUSE OF DEFAULT IN THE TOWSON ELECTRONICS CASE
This contract failed because of indecisiveness and
inaction on the part of Towson Electronics. There were some
discrepancies on the part of the Government, but a proactive
management team from the contractor would have been more
aggressive in resolving any disparities and commencing work.
This would include obtaining the necessary COMSEC materials
account number and developing the quality assurance plan to
the satisfaction of the QAR
.
THE CAUSES OF DEFAULT IN THE OKLAHOMA RADIO CASE
This small company was unable to maintain upper level
management stability throughout its history. Responsibility
for financial difficulties was levied on management personnel
who were relieved before having the opportunity to fully
assess the deficiencies in the company's financial structure
which were the root causes of insolvency.
The accounting system was inadequate because it was
incapable of isolating costs associated with indirect
materials and labor. Some contracts were successful, however,
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the inability to properly isolate costs allocated certain
costs with inappropriate contracts. This illustrates why the
unit price in the original proposal was so low ($1079). The
average unit price paid to Magnavox for the initial
provisioning of each AN/PRC-68 radio was $1887. The $7.5
million in progress payments paid to Oklahoma Radio divided by
the 4074 radio sets delivered reveals a price of $1841 per
radio set paid by the Government. The company could only
justify a price of $1079 per radio due to the deficient
accounting system. The price of $1841 seems reasonable in
relation to the Magnavox price, inflation and product
improvement
.
THE INDICATORS IN THE TOWSON ELECTRONICS CASE
This contract contains many obvious indicators that the
firm's management was not aggressively attempting to make
progress. The key indicators which should have resulted in
more timely action in the administration of this contract
were
:
• The need to revise the attainment of the COMSEC
materials account number from 45 days to 90 days
• The empty production facility 51 days after contract
award
• The failure to obtain the approved quality assurance
plan within the specified 30 days after contract
award
49
• The request to obtain special tooling four months
after contract award with first article testing due
six months after award
• No vendor parts orders submitted upon contract
award, shortly thereafter or in the ensuing four
months
.
THE INDICATORS IN THE OKLAHOMA RADIO CASE
In this case one of the causes of default, upper
management instability, has the high turnover of personnel as
its indicator. These contracts are difficult to administer
and manage for an individual familiar with the case. They
become virtually impossible to contend with if those who are
in decision making capacity are regularly transferred to other
assignments
.
The accounting system deficiencies were indicated at the
time the proposals were submitted. The unreasonably low
proposal price should have foretold at the outset that the
company may have had an ineffective system. The inability to
substantiate the $1.5 million claim could also have
illustrated that the firm's cost accounting system was
deficient
.
RECOMMENDED ACTIONS IN THE TOWSON ELECTRONICS CASE
Since this contract required expansion of the contractor's
facility; the approval of a quality assurance plan and the
acquisition of a COMSEC materials account number by the
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contractor, more aggressive monitoring of progress on these
critical milestones was necessary. Significant delays in the
follow-up of the contractor's progress materially contributed
to the default. Since this contract represented an entry into
the field of Government contracting for the contractor, more
stringent contract administration would probably have
prompted appropriate progress. Had greater scrutiny not
produced progress from the contractor, then an earlier
termination would have been possible and the necessity to
convert from a Termination for Default to a Termination for
Convenience could have been avoided thereby allowing the
Government to recover some of the costs associated with
reprocurement
.
RECOMMENDED ACTIONS IN THE OKLAHOMA RADIO CASE
Because this company had historically demonstrated the
ability to produce high quality equipment, there should have
been a greater effort made on part of the Government to assist
Oklahoma Radio with their managerial and financial
difficulties. The Small Business Administration, for example,
is authorized to provide grants to 8(a) companies for
managerial training. If the management had the ability to
isolate the true cause of the financial difficulties to the
accounting system, action would have been initiated by the
company to upgrade the system, thereby halting the insidious
deterioration of their financial status. The accounting
system problems caused the failure of the company, but
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managerial assistance would have saved it. To illustrate the
cost to the Government of the failure of this company, an
examination of the cost to finish the procurement of the 3865
radio sets still required is appropriate. No current source
exists. Preliminary discussions with Magnavox to re-initiate
production indicate a unit cost to the Government of
approximately $2880. The extended price of the contract would
be about $11.2 million. It is obvious that managerial
training or accounting consultant services for Oklahoma Radio
would have been a much more economical alternative.
D. CASES 3A AND 3B
THE REQUIREMENTS
A) The Basic Electronics Maintenance Trainer (BEMT) is a
training device for electronics technicians. It is composed
of a series of stations and a Trainer Central Control (TCC)
unit. The system provides a self-paced study course for the
student which simulates a wide variety of electronic
configurations. By changing the software, the instructor can
replicate malfunctions and component failures, and interject
system faults to develop troubleshooting skills. The contract
called for 220 individual stations and a TCC. Each station
can be used without the TCC, but the software must then be
individually loaded to each station and the instructor could
then monitor only one student at a time.
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B) The TEAMPAC Intelligence training device is a desktop
simulator which provides unit and intermediate level
intelligence maintenance tasks for military students. The
device produces both simple and complex intelligence scenarios
describing a situation to the student followed by intelligence
data and a sequence of events. The student must utilize this
new information to update the intelligence situation and
generate new intelligence reports. Each training device is
self contained and is designed to draw on the skills the
students acquired during classroom and field work. The
initial contract requirement called for development and
prototype production.
THE CONTRACTORS
The original contractor for the BEMT was Creative
Concepts, located in Holly Hills, Florida. The parent company
of Creative Concepts is Wolf Technology, a large producer of
radar detection devices. This contract was only the third
Federal Government contract Creative Concepts had ever
received. The majority of its business base was the Florida
State Government and commercial firms in Florida. The primary
products manufactured by the company were video disk machines
and associated video disks which provided short informational
and recreational program clips on a television monitor.
Ferris International, another 8(a) firm headquartered in
El Segundo, California, had considerable experience in
Government contracting and maintained a reputation for well
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built electronic devices. The company was significantly
dependant on Government contracts and required progress
payments for all work to be performed. When the company was
awarded the contract for the BEMT after the failure of
Creative Concepts, the senior management decided to lease the
building Creative Concepts had utilized and hire many of that
company's former employees to perform the contract at the
Holly Hills, Florida site. The TEAMPAC contract was awarded
to Ferris International while the company was performing the
BEMT contract. This contract was also to be performed at the
Holly Hills, Florida site.
THE CONTRACTS
A) The Creative Concepts contract for the BEMT was a $2.8
million Firm Fixed Price contract to produce the 220 stations
and the TCC . The contract allowed for 90% progress payments
and established a delivery schedule over a two year period
after contract award in November, 1986. There was no
Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) associated with the
contract
.
The Ferris International contract for the BEMT was a $2.9
million Firm Fixed Price contract to finish the project
initiated by Creative Concepts. Creative Concepts had
delivered 110 of the 220 stations and had the components to
produce most of the remaining 110 units and the TCC. These
components were provided to Ferris International as GFE in
support of the contract. The contractor's proposal was
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submitted in December, 1988 and the contract was awarded in
May of 1989. This new contract required some updated software
and design technology which consequently required Ferris
International to modify the 110 stations produced by Creative
Concepts
.
B) The TEAMPAC contract awarded to Ferris International
was a $2 million development and prototype production Firm
Fixed Price contract. The contract did not require any GFE
and was considered to be a low risk venture. The development
period was to last six months with a production period not to
exceed 18 months following development.
THE CREATIVE CONCEPTS SITUATION
As previously mentioned above, this was only the third
Federal Government contract the firm had been awarded. One of
the other two contracts was with the Navy for a signals
intelligence recognition device and the other was with the Air
Force for a C-5 aircraft cockpit procedures trainer/simulator.
The cockpit trainer contract was priced at $26 million.
The first year of the BEMT contract progressed
satisfactorily with respect to the trainer stations. Near the
end of the first year, however, delays in development of the
TCC were encountered. The company began to experience
financial difficulties associated with the C-5 contract at
this time which was significantly more complex and larger than
any effort entered into by the company previously. The
Government took delivery of 110 of the stations but would not
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accept additional stations or provide progress payments on the
remaining stations until greater progress was made on the TCC.
The Contracting Officer's Technical Representative (COTR)
indicated to the PCO that little effort was underway on the
TCC and that some of the engineers working on the project were
reassigned to assist in the larger C-5 effort. Creative
Concepts responded to this by indicating that the software
subcontractor was late and the engineers were temporarily
reassigned to avoid their becoming idle. The company also
cited vague coding problems as contributing to the development
delay of the TCC.
In February, 1988 DCAS warned MCLB Albany, GA that the
contractor was suffering from increased financial problems and
that the company's suppliers were now dealing with Creative
Concepts on a cash only basis. The Naval Investigative
Service (NIS) then initiated an investigation following
allegations that Creative Concepts had begun applying a mark-
up of subcontractor invoices by as much as 25% and passing the
costs to the Government on the signals intelligence device
contract. These allegations spread to the C-5 contract and
consequently DCAS suspended all progress payments. Creative
Concepts had received $2.2 million of the $2.8 million
associated with the BEMT contract. A Cure Notice was issued
in September, 1988 requiring significant progress on the TCC,
but no response was provided by the company. It was clear
that the company was facing serious litigation and was certain
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to enter bankruptcy. The owner of Wolf Technology travelled
to the Holly Hills, Florida site when he was made aware of the
Cure Notice and suspended every employee on what was called a
temporary basis. The owner then had the plant secured and
would not make any comments regarding his actions to the ACO.
Following this action, a team consisting of the contract
specialist, the COTR, the program manager and his assistant
went to the Holly Hills, Florida site to inventory all work-
in-process items and components. The team gained access to
the plant and found approximately 89% of the material
necessary to complete the remaining 110 stations and about 30%
of the components for the TCC . At this point (12 October
1980) the PCO at MCLB Albany, GA directed that the contract be
terminated for convenience so that this material could be
removed expeditiously, to avoid the massive legal action which
was obviously pending. As a result of this timely action, the
program was spared the excessively long delays which would
have resulted from bankruptcy and fraud litigation.
THE FERRIS INTERNATIONAL SITUATION
Following the dissolution of Creative Concepts, the PCO at
MCLB Albany, GA immediately solicited another contractor to
satisfy the BEMT requirement. Ferris International was
selected on a sole source basis under the 8(a) program and the
company submitted its bid in December, 1988. Extensive
negotiations were conducted regarding the updated software
package and necessary modifications delaying contract award
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until May of 1989. Delivery of the BEMT package was already
seven months behind the original schedule.
The early progress on the BEMT was to be made on
development of the TCC and the modification requirements for
the existing 110 stations. Production was to begin in June of
1990 on the remaining stations.
Ferris International incurred substantial debt in its
expansion effort in Florida. The bid on the BEMT and
subsequently the TEAMPAC contracts reflected overhead rates
which were to assist in the liquidating of this debt. Costs
associated with the expansion were higher than the company
expected and were higher on the Firm Fixed Price BEMT contract
as well which placed the company in a tenuous financial
posture beginning in July, 1989. The first indication of the
financial problems at Ferris International arose when the COTR
told of layoffs at the Holly Hills, Florida site of employees
engaged in the development of the TCC. Delivery of technical
data relating to the TCC began to fall behind schedule by late
September. The DCAS Pre-award Survey of the company for the
TEAMPAC contract indicated that the company was spending
excessive amounts of money in management salaries and
administrative costs. DCAS recommended that another source be
identified because of concern that the company was going to
encounter serious and long term cash flow shortages unless
significant streamlining of the management and administrative
structures at the company were initiated. During
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negotiations, the former Vice President for Government
contracts liaison at Ferris International corresponded with
MCLB Albany, GA and provided as an enclosure to his letter a
copy of a petition to a claims court which would force Ferris
International to provide him with back pay due. The contract
for the Teampac devices was awarded to Ferris International
in the face of these occurrences in November, 1989.
Additional layoffs occurred throughout January, February,
and March of 1990 at the Holly Hills, Florida site resulting
in very limited progress on the TCC . Furthermore, no progress
was made on the TEAMPAC contract. On 1 June 1990 Ferris
International discontinued its lease payments on the Holly
Hills, Florida site. This action did not become immediately
apparent to the Government. On 15 June 1990 notice to proceed
on the remaining BEMT stations was provided to Ferris
International. A conference was held at the contractor's
plant on 24 July 1990 to discuss progress on both the BEMT and
TEAMPAC contracts. At the opening of the conference the
senior representative from Ferris International announced the
layoff of all the Holly Hills, Florida plant employees. A
Cure Notice was provided to the home office of Ferris
International in El Segundo, California on 26 July 1990
advising the company of an anticipatory breach of contract as
a result of the dismissal of its employees. The company was
given five days to respond, however, no response was ever
received. All GFE was removed from the plant and the contract
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was Terminated for Default on 8 August 1990. The contracting
officer decided that a Termination for Default was required
based on the determination that the facts of this case
constituted anticipatory repudiation of the contract.
THE CAUSES OF DEFAULT IN THE CREATIVE CONCEPTS CASE
Creative Concepts failed for two reasons. First, the
company underbid the contracts for the signals intelligence
device and the C-5 cockpit procedures simulator. The firm
lacked the necessary experience in dealing with the rigid
requirements associated with Federal Government contracting.
When the realization that they had underbid became apparent,
the company resorted to fraudulent activities in attempt to
diminish potential losses. Secondly, the company failed
because it was saturated given the delivery schedules of the
individual contracts previously awarded.
THE CAUSE OF DEFAULT IN THE FERRIS INTERNATIONAL CASE
Ferris International entered bankruptcy because of an
underestimation of the cost of expansion in Florida and
because of the inefficiencies in operating the business. The
company simply did not have the working capital needed to
maintain the necessary cash flow required to operate their
newly leased facility. The management of the company failed
to obtain a sufficient commercial market for their products
and could not survive on the closely regulated profit margins
associated with Government contracts.
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THE INDICATORS IN THE CREATIVE CONCEPTS CASE
The pre-award survey of Creative Concepts should have
illustrated the company's inexperience in the field of Federal
Government contracting. This inexperience should have
indicated that greater scrutiny of this firm was necessary.
Late delivery of any portion of a contract serves as an
indicator of difficulty at any firm. The late delivery of
the TCC data package, coupled with the vague excuses regarding
software and coding problems is a solid indicator that the
firm was experiencing a problem.
When suppliers deliver on a cash only basis and NIS
initiates a fraud investigation it becomes clear that
financial difficulties are present. And, although occurring
late in this contract period, wholesale layoffs and plant
lock-outs are clear indicators that a contractor is facing
failure
.
THE INDICATORS IN THE FERRIS INTERNATIONAL CASE
The failure of Ferris International was foreshadowed by
various indicators. Significant dependence on Government
contracts and the need for progress payments for all work
should indicate a lack of available financing or working
capital to meet cash flow requirements. The expansion effort
represented an assumption of risk and costs by the company.
The layoffs reported by the COTR; the poor results of the
TEAMPAC pre-award survey and the letter from the irate Vice
President, all of which occurred just prior to the TEAMPAC
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award, were three sure indicators that should have signalled
that Ferris was in trouble. Insufficient progress on the TCC
for the BEMT contract and failure to start on the TEAMPAC
contract amounted to late delivery, a common indicator of
financial, technical or managerial difficulty. Wholesale
layoffs in this firm again foreshadowed a pending financial
disaster
.
RECOMMENDED ACTIONS IN THE CREATIVE CONCEPTS CASE
Given the inexperience Creative Concepts had relative to
Government contracting, an examination of the magnitude and
performance of the other two contracts might have shown that
the company was reaching its maximum capacity without the BEMT
contract. This pre-award review action might have caused the
Government to award the BEMT contract to another firm. This
contract for Creative Concepts did not force the company into
bankruptcy; another Government contract did. Any action taken
designed to cure the late deliveries or layoffs based on this
contract would probably have been immaterial in the face of
the fraudulent activity which occurred. The best course of
action for the Government in this case would have been to
terminate as soon as the indicators pointed with some
certainty that the company was in serious trouble. The
Termination for Convenience in this case was particularly
appropriate given the circumstances. The company had already
received $2.2 million when the contract was terminated. The
Government had 110 of the BEMT stations and 89% of the
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required components for the other 110 in addition to the
technical data and 30%. of the TCC components. The simplicity
of the Termination for Convenience procedure given the pending
litigation and the reality that the majority of the material
costs to complete the contract were already incurred, the
Termination for Convenience was the most economical approach.
RECOMMENDED ACTIONS IN THE FERRIS INTERNATIONAL CASE
The Ferris International case illustrates an example
similar to the Oklahoma Radio case in that financial
difficulties were brought on as a result of the failure of the
senior executives to recognize and correct the areas which
were draining resources. In the Oklahoma Radio case the cause
was the accounting system, and in this case the cause was
excessive management costs and administrative inefficiency.
As in the Oklahoma Radio case, had the Government provided
either managerial training or managerial consultant services
the company could possibly have ascertained where streamlining
was needea and implemented action to reorganize the company
and assure successful performance of both the BEMT and TEAMPAC
contracts. Another lesson to be learned from this case is
that if a company is facing significant financial difficulty
in the pre-award phase of a contract, as indicated by a poor
DCAS survey, employee layoffs, late deliveries, and unpaid
employees, then that company should not be considered
responsible enough to perform. Additional contract awards
such as the TEAMPAC award are not in the best interest of
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either party and only serve to delay a program until a new
contractor can be found.
E. CASES 4A AND B
THE REQUIREMENTS
A) The Guardian Armor/Artillery simulator is a full crew
interactive training device for both tank crews and howitzer
artillery teams. The requirement in this case amounted to full
scale development, prototype testing, completion of level
three drawings and the submission of all associated software
and life cycle cost supporting documentation.
B) The Cobra helicopter simulator is a cockpit procedures
and weapon systems training device. The device provides low
cost simulated flight hours and interjects random emergency
situations and enemy targeting profiles. Pilots can then be
evaluated on their knowledge of appropriate emergency
procedures and can improve their skills in the selection and
utilization of appropriate available weaponry and target
engagement. The contract requirements were the same as those
for the Guardian simulator.
THE CONTRACTOR
Dedalus Incorporated is an 8(a) firm headquartered in
Columbia, Maryland, with an additional facility in Orlando,
Florida. Dedalus Incorporated had previous experience in
contracting with the Federal Government and had successfully
completed work for the U.S. Army and Air Force. At the time
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these contracts were awarded both the Army and Air Force had
active contracts with the firm. The company was considered to
be extremely competent and had produced solid electronics and
software packages but did not develop a significant commercial
market base.
THE CONTRACTS
A) The Guardian Armor and Artillery trainer was a $6.4
million Firm Fixed Price full scale development contract. It
was awarded in September, 1987 to be completed by 1 September
1991. This contract was to be performed at the Columbia,
Maryland site.
B) The Cobra helicopter simulator was a $12.6 million
Firm Fixed Price full scale development contract awarded in
July of 1990. Both contracts called for 90% progress payments
based on percentage of work completed. This contract was to
be performed at the company's plant in Orlando, Florida.
THE SITUATION
From the time the Guardian contract was awarded until
January of 1991 there was no indication that the contract was
in jeopardy. The development of the software and prototype
trainer progressed according to the terms of the contract and
in accordance with the bilaterally approved modifications
negotiated during contract performance. Successful testing of
the prototype occurred in December, 1990 and initial
deliveries of software documentation and life cycle cost
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information were made. It appeared that the contract for the
Guardian would be completed by the 1 September 1991 delivery-
date. The performance on the Guardian contract was sufficient
justification to award the Cobra contract in July, 1990 with
confidence that Dedalus would satisfy both requirements. The
technology was similar and some of the initial ground work for
the Cobra device had been developed in the early phases of the
Guardian effort.
In January, 1991 the first indications of difficulty at
Dedalus began to appear. The January rental payment for the
Orlando, Florida site went unpaid for 47 days until 16
February, 1991. February's rent was never paid. Validity
Incorporated, one of Dedalus' largest subcontractors received
its last payment on 5 January 1991 and went unpaid from
Dedalus' progress payments in February, March, and April.
DCMAO, Baltimore, Maryland completed a financial capability
review of Dedalus on 10 March 1991 and characterized the
contractor's position as marginally satisfactory based upon
financial statements from 28 September 1990. In April the
Internal Revenue Service indicted the owners of the firm for
federal income tax evasion and indicated charges of
embezzlement were pending.
Progress payments were suspended on 26 April 1991 until
all audits of the company were completed by DCAA to prevent
Dedalus from receiving excess payments prior to declaring
bankruptcy.
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The Maryland National Bank froze the company's credit line
the same day and efforts on all contracts by the firm ceased.
Despite these occurrences, both the Guardian and the Cobra
contracts were still on schedule. The U.S. Army and Air Force
contracts with Dedalus were, however, significantly delayed.
The owner of Dedalus was arrested as he tried to flee the
country to avoid prosecution on 9 June 1991. Two of Dedalus'
largest subcontractors, Validity Incorporated and Western
Computers expressed interest in purchasing Dedalus if novation
of the contracts to the new owner could be accomplished.
Western Computer, another 8(a) firm, provided the best offer
which included completing all of Dedalus' 8(a) contracts,
hiring Dedalus' employees, buying Dedalus' accounts receivable
and acquiring certain assets of Dedalus. 13 CFR 124.317(a)
states "...a contract (including options) awarded pursuant to
section 8(a) of the Small Business Act... shall be performed by
the concern that initially received such contract. If the
owner upon. . .whom eligibility was based relinquishes ownership
or control... of such concern ... such contract or option shall
be terminated for the convenience of the Government." 13 CFR
124.317(d) also states "A procuring agency may request a
waiver of the requirements of paragraph (a) of this section
if the head of the procuring agency certifies that termination
of the contract would severely impair attainment of the agency
program objectives or missions." MCLB Albany, Georgia
provided the certification in their request for waiver to the
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SBA in a letter dated 18 July 1991. The results of the
letter, the novation procedure and the outcome of these two
contracts are currently pending. All indications suggest that
Western Computer will receive the contracts and control of
Dedalus Incorporated and will complete them in a reasonable
time frame.
THE CAUSE OF DEFAULT
This company failed because of the owner's embezzlement of
funds. The firm had the technical, managerial and financial
resource to complete all the contracts it had been awarded.
As the owner began his criminal activity, the financial
posture of the firm began to erode. The company was not able
to maintain solvency as a result of this drain of resources.
THE INDICATORS
The firm had been performing very well up until nine
months before its failure. The indications that difficulties
were being encountered began with the marginal financial
statements in September, 1990. The unpaid rent on the
Orlando, Florida plant; the cessation of payments to
subcontractors and the IRS indictment followed, all of which
pointed to the eventual failure of the company.
RECOMMENDED ACTIONS
The audit of financial statements for 8(a) firms should
not require six months time. If the DCMAO financial
capability review had been performed in a more timely manner,
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the contracting officer would have been aware of the
deteriorating financial position of Dedalus Incorporated much
earlier. The contracting officer was not aware of the unpaid
rent or the failure to pay subcontractors until mid-April when
it was too late to take any effective action. Had the
contracting officer been aware of the marginal financial
statements, closer scrutiny of the company's financial
dealings would have resulted which would have led to the
discovery of the other indicators of financial trouble. If
these indicators been discovered when they occurred, progress
payments could have been suspended earlier thereby saving
money for the Government. When the contractor fails due to
criminal activity, it is difficult to implement actions to
assist the company. Early action in the administration of
contract performance, however, will same time and money.
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IV. THE 8(A) PROGRAM SURVEY RESULTS
The contracting officers and small business advocates at
the 10 United States Marine Corps contracting offices were
surveyed to assist in this research effort during April and
May of 1991 relative to the primary causes of 8(a) firm
failure/contract default; the key indicators of the
difficulties leading to failure/default and the steps which
the Government should reasonably have taken to alleviate these
difficulties. The information obtained from these responses
provides valuable insight in the administration of 8(a)
contracts
.
The survey indicated that the most common causes of 8(a)
contract default are, in order from most common to least
common: insufficient working capital, lack of technical
expertise, inexperienced/poor management and lack of knowledge
regarding dealing with Government requirements. Other causes
listed were: inadequate accounting systems, poor estimating
systems, poor staffing and the collapse of the firm when
required to assume a greater percentage of non-8(a) business.
The following table illustrates the number of times each
cause was listed by those who responded to the survey. Twenty
questionnaires were sent out. All went to the ten U. S.
Marine Corps contracting offices. Ten were sent to the
contracting officers and ten were sent to the small business
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advocates. Their responses were extremely similar indicating
that little bias existed toward the program from either set of





CAUSE # CITING CAUSE
INSUFFICIENT WORKING CAPITAL 13
LACK OF TECHNICAL EXPERTISE 10
INEXPERIENCED/POOR MANAGEMENT 8
POOR KNOWLEDGE IN DEALING WITH GOVERNMENT 5
POOR ESTIMATING SYSTEMS 2
INADEQUATE ACCOUNTING SYSTEM 2
POOR STAFFING 1
INABILITY TO SURVIVE WITHOUT HIGH % OF
GOVERNMENT WORK 1
These causes of failure warrant closer scrutiny to
illustrate the indications which can be observed during
contract administration that signal difficulties are being
encountered which could lead to default and the steps which
should reasonably be taken by the Government to relieve the
difficulties thereby preventing default. It should be noted
that every respondent to the survey indicated that the
majority of the problems encountered with 8(a) contracts could
have been avoided had the SBA conducted adequate pre-award
actions to correct contractor's material deficiencies or
disqualify the contractor due to incapability of performance
of a particular contract without improvement in one or more
critical areas of the company.
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An examination of these causes of failure follows to
provide insight and recommended steps to improve dealings with
8(a) firms as described by the respondents to the survey. The
title heading refers to the cause of default or firm failure.
The column of indicators provides events or observations
evident during contract administration which can diagnose a
potential cause of failure or default. The "number citing
indicator" column refers to the number of surveys received
which noted this indicator as associated with the cause of
failure or default. The steps to alleviate difficulties are





INDICATOR j CITING INDICATOR
REQUESTS FOR ADVANCE PAYMENTS 7
REQUESTS FOR UNUSUAL PROGRESS PAYMENTS 4
INABILITY TO HANDLE CONTRACT GROWTH 3
DELAY IN PROCURING MATERIALS 2
UNUSUAL REQUESTS FOR GFE 1
COMPANY HAS POOR RATING WITH CREDITORS 1
COMPANY HAS HIGH DEBT TO EQUITY RATIO 1
STEPS TO ALLEVIATE DIFFICULTIES # CITING STEP
BETTER PRE-AWARD SURVEY 13
PROVIDE ADVANCE PAYMENTS TO SOLID FIRMS 7
PROVIDE TIMELY PROGRESS PAYMENTS 5
PROVIDE UNUSUAL PROGRESS PAYMENTS 4
INSTITUTE CLOSE FINANCIAL MONITORING 2
PROVIDE FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT TRAINING 2
EXERCISE LENIENCY IN PRICING ADJUSTMENTS 1
LIMIT GROWTH IN CONTRACT TO A PERCENTAGE 1
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TABLE IV
LACK OF TECHNICAL EXPERTISE
INDICATOR # CITING INDICATOR
REQUESTS FOR EXTENSIONS 5
FIRST ARTICLE TEST FAILURE 3
DIFFICULTY RESPONDING TO CHANGES 3
LACK OF CREDENTIALS FOR ENGINEERS 2
ENGINEERS NOT FAMILIAR WITH STATE-OF-THE-ART 1
INCOMPLETE TECHNICAL REPORTS 1
COST OVERRUNS 1
HIGH ENGINEERING PERSONNEL TURNOVER 1
STEPS TO ALLEVIATE DIFFICULTIES # CITING STEP
BETTER PRE-AWARD SURVEY 7
ACCURATELY CLASSIFY A FIRM'S CAPABILITIES 3
LIMIT CHANGES AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE 2
ALLOW EXTENSIONS IF POSSIBLE 2
TERMINATE CONTRACT EARLY WHEN DEFAULT IS




INDICATOR # CITING INDICATOR
MANAGERS LACK FORMAL TRAINING/DEGREES 5
FAMILY MEMBERS MANAGE MOST/ALL OF FIRM 3
HIGH MANAGERIAL TURNOVER 2
MANAGER HAS WORKED IN OTHER FAILED 8(A) FIRMS 1
EMPLOYEES INDICATE DISSATISFACTION WITH MANAGEMENT 1
STEPS TO ALLEVIATE DIFFICULTIES # CITING STEP
BETTER PRE-AWARD AUDIT OF MANAGEMENT 7
PROVIDE MANAGEMENT TRAINING AT GOVERNMENT EXPENSE 4
REQUIRE MANAGEMENT TRAINING AT CONTRACTOR EXPENSE 2
RECOMMEND MILESTONE PLAN FOR CONTRACT PERFORMANCE 1
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TABLE VI
LACK OF KNOWLEDGE REGARDING
DEALING WITH GOVERNMENT REQUIREMENTS
INDICATOR # CITING INDICATOR
INADEQUATE REPORTING OF CONTRACT STATUS 3
CONTRACTOR HAS DIFFICULTY UNDERSTANDING COMMON
CLAUSES IN CONTRACT 3
CONTRACTOR NOT FAMILIAR WITH TINA 1
CONTRACTOR SURPRISED BY GOVERNMENT ABILITY TO
MAKE UNILATERAL CHANGES 1
CONTRACTOR NOT FAMILIAR WITH FAR 1
STEPS TO ALLEVIATE DIFFICULTIES # CITING STEP
BETTER PRE-AWARD SURVEY 4
MINIMIZE ADMINISTRATIVE REQUIREMENTS 2
PROVIDE PRE- AND POST-AWARD CONFERENCES TO ASSIST
CONTRACTOR 2




INDICATOR # CITING INDICATOR
DELINQUENT DELIVERY 2
REQUESTS FOR DELIVERY EXTENSION 1
VENDOR REPORTS DO/DX ORDERS TOOK PRECEDENCE AND
DELAYED DELIVERY 1
COST OVERRUNS 1
STEPS TO ALLEVIATE DIFFICULTIES # CITING STEP
BETTER PRE-AWARD EXAMINATION OF ESTIMATING SYSTEM 2
FORCE FIRM TO FULLY SUBSTANTIATE ESTIMATES PRIOR
TO AWARD AND FOR CHANGES 2
MAKE CONSULTING SERVICES AVAILABLE TO CONTRACTOR




INDICATOR # CITING INDICATOR
LACK OF DATA TO SUPPORT COST PROPOSALS 2
DIFFICULTY IN RETRIEVING SIMPLE COST INFORMATION 1
IMPROPER OVERHEAD ALLOCATION TECHNIQUES 1
STEPS TO ALLEVIATE DIFFICULTIES # CITING STEP
PROVIDE CONSULTANT TO UPGRADE ACCOUNTING SYSTEM 1




INDICATOR # CITING INDICATOR
LONG DELAYS IN RESPONDING TO ADMINISTRATIVE
REQUESTS OR CHANGE REQUESTS 1
RELIANCE ON ONE/FEW INDIVIDUALS FOR ALL DECISIONS 1
STEPS TO ALLEVIATE DIFFICULTIES # CITING STEP
RELAX DEMANDS WHICH REQUIRE SPECIALIZED RESPONSE 1
ALLOW MORE TIME FOR RESPONSES FROM CONTRACTOR 1
PROVIDED PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT CONSULTING 1
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TABLE X
INABILITY TO SURVIVE WITHOUT A
HIGH PERCENTAGE OF GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS
INDICATOR # CITING INDICATOR
MOST OR ALL WORK WITH THE GOVERNMENT 1
SBA HAS COUNSELLED CONTRACTOR ON SHORTFALL IN
MEETING NON-8 (A) CONTRACT REQUIREMENTS 1
STEPS TO ALLEVIATE DIFFICULTIES # CITING STEP
DETERMINE GOVERNMENT RELIANCE DURING PRE-AWARD
SURVEY 1
TRY TO ILLUSTRATE COMMERCIAL APPLICATIONS FOR
CURRENT GOVERNMENT WORK 1
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A . CONCLUSIONS
In addition to the information relative to causes and
indicators of default and the steps to preclude them, the
survey solicited information regarding the benefits associated
with the 8(a) program. The benefits most commonly listed were:
• THE PROGRAM EXPANDS THE INDUSTRIAL BASE
• CONTRACTS CAN BE AWARDED VERY RAPIDLY UNDER THE PROGRAM
• THE PROGRAM PROVIDES EMPLOYMENT IN DEPRESSED AREAS
• THE PROGRAM INCREASES COMPETITION BY ASSISTING NEW
BUSINESS
These benefits can become valuable assets to the
contracting officer. They cannot be realized if the
contractor does not deliver the goods however. As indicated
in Chapter II, the SBA is not adequately staffed to perform
all the required services relative to managing the 8(a)
program. One significant shortcoming is the inability to
perform comprehensive pre-award actions. The only recourse
available to the contracting officer is to deal with the
contractor's particular situation in the post-award phase.
The key to successful contract actions with 8(a) firms is the
ability to recognize the indicators that firms are facing
difficulties in contract performance and to act to alleviate
these difficulties in a reasonable and responsible manner.
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It is clear that this thesis does not completely enumerate
the causes of default on the part of 8(a) firms. It does not
provide a collectively exhaustive list of indicators of
difficulty, nor can it serve as a comprehensive "what-to-do-
when" guide for contract administration. The information
contained in this thesis does, however, indicate what some of
the primary causes of 8(a) contract default and 8(a) firm
failure are, and that they can be diagnosed before it is too
late through key indicators that the contracting officer can
easily observe. The steps to alleviate the difficulties
leading to default which are provided in the thesis are
examples of relatively simple yet economically significant
measures which will result in greater success when dealing
with 8(a) companies. The contracting officer must be alert
for unusual conditions, actions or omissions on the part of
the contractor and be aware that observable indicators exist
which may signal future difficulties. Just as each element of
a contract has meaning and cannot be excluded or interpreted
in a manner which renders it inconseguential , each action or
failure to act on the part of the contractor has meaning
relative to the performance of a particular contract or to the
condition of company in general. These actions or failures to
act on the part of the contractor can be utilized by the
contracting officer as indicators of potential difficulties
which may be encountered by the contractor which could
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ultimately jeopardize the completion of the contract or
foreshadow the failure of the firm.
B . RECOMMENDATIONS
Each contracting officer will have to determine what
action is appropriate in response to an indication that some
difficulty is to be encountered in contract performance. The
examples of recommended actions contained in this thesis
provide measures which in hindsight, may have prompted success
instead of failure for an 8(a) firm. There are other
approaches which could be taken which might alleviate the
difficulties, as well as, or better than those provided. The
single most important recommendation for each case is to take
some form of action as early as possible. Small problems tend
to become extremely large and deficiencies which would be
relatively easy to correct in early stages become exacerbated
over time. Insidious problems like the Oklahoma Radio
accounting system shortcomings cause a misdiagnosed
deterioration of a company until it collapses. Missed
milestones or delivery dates must be aggressively investigated
upon occurrence. Layoffs, disgruntled creditors and unpaid
employees indicate financial or managerial difficulties which
could be alleviated using the assistance available from the
SBA under the 8(a) program or from the contracting officer.
With this attitude in mind, the contracting officer can
efficiently examine selected aspects of a firm in a timely
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manner and act to correct deficiencies thus promoting success
in contracting with minority owned firms.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY
The following areas should be studied to more accurately
determine the role and responsibility the Government should
assume relative to insuring successful 8(a) contract actions
and the survival of 8(a) firms:
• An analysis of the requirements the Government must
satisfy in monitoring 8(a) firms compared with the
number of employees assigned these duties at the SBA
and the number of 8(a) firms requiring monitoring to
determine the feasibility and reasonableness of the
current statutes governing the 8(a) program.
• A study which attempts to more thoroughly catalog the
relationship between occurrences or circumstances
recognized during contract performance and their root
causes which would serve as a management tool for
contract administrators to illustrate how these
occurrences and circumstances can indicate where
difficulties in contract performance are occurring.
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